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ABSTRACT
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little inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become
compressed. We discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust case
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A recent antitrust suit charged that the National Resident Matching Program
suppresses the wages of medical residents. The match, which uses a Gale-Shapley
procedure to assign seniors in medical schools to residency programs in various med-
ical specialties, was developed for eﬃciency reasons, and on that score it appears to
do quite well.1 That is, the right residents appear to get assigned to pretty much the
right residency programs. At the same time, for young doctors who have just com-
pleted four years of medical school, salaries are low, averaging around $40,000 per
year, and compressed, and work hours are l o n g ,8 0h o u r saw e e ki nm a n yp r o g r a m s . 2
While salary diﬀerentials are only one way in which residency programs might com-
pete, the compression of salaries within programs, within specialties, and across ﬁelds
is remarkable, compared to the variation in pay among more senior doctors.
We develop a model that shows why a market like that for medical residents is
likely to have the features described, namely good eﬃciency properties, salaries that
are below those in any competitive allocation, and severe compression in compensa-
tion. The key elements are two: competition is likely to be somewhat localized, with
hospitals basically competing against others like themselves, and hospitals cannot
easily make oﬀers that discriminate among candidates. The model does not argue
against a centralized match, but rather explains how the absence of personalized
prices can soften competition in a matching market.
We consider a model in which both “hospitals” and “residents” are easily ranked
and match surplus exhibits increasing diﬀerences so that higher ranked hospitals place
more value on attracting higher ranked residents. Eﬃciency in this setting dictates
an assortative matching of hospitals and residents. To model competition, we assume
1Alvin Roth and collaborators have written a fascinating series of papers documenting the history
of the match, the reasons for its success, and changes in its structure over time; key references include
Roth (1984), Roth and Xing (1994), and Roth and Peranson (1999). The ﬁrst theoretical study of
matching algorithms is by Gale and Shapley (1962), who analyzed a “deferred acceptance” procedure
that is similar both to the procedure then used by the NRMP and to the one currently in use. Their
algorithm was extended to allow for endogenous price determination in two important papers by
Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982). Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2005) unify and
extend many of the central results in the literature.
2The antitrust case was dismissed in the summer of 2004 after Congress intervened on the side
of the hospitals. Discussions of the case include Chae (2003) and Miller and Greaney (2003).
1that hospitals make oﬀers, with the hospital that makes the best oﬀer getting the
best resident and so on. An analogy would be to a condominium auction where
buyers make sealed bids and pay their own bids, with bidders receiving priority in
choosing units based on the rank order of their bids. As in the auction analogy,
we treat hospitals’ oﬀers as prices, but it is easy to re-interpret the oﬀe r sa sn o n -
wage compensation or as investments hospitals make that provide utility to their
residents. Regardless of the interpretation, the crucial feature is the “all-pay” element
to competition. A hospital will pay its oﬀer regardless of the resident it actually
matches with; it cannot oﬀer 5x for the obstetrical Barry Bonds, but only x for the
obstetrical Mario Mendoza.3
Were hospitals identical in their distributions for the value of obtaining the best
residents this system would lead to eﬃcient matching and the same average wages as a
system with personalized oﬀers, although it would create some fairly mild compression
in salaries. But the reality is that hospitals have a sense of where they stand, with
more highly ranked hospitals eﬀectively competing for more highly ranked candidates.
This, combined with the all-pay feature, introduces a slight ineﬃciency and dampens
competition.
In a competitive equilibrium salaries adjust so that each hospital prefers to hire
the resident who is its eﬃcient match. The salary diﬀerential between two “adjacent”
residents must lie between the extra amount that the lower and higher of the ﬁrms
with which the residents will match would pay for the superior worker. So the surplus
of the better hospital will exceed that of the lower hospital by an amount somewhere
between the value of output the two ﬁrms obtain with the lesser worker and the value
of output the two ﬁr m so b t a i nw i t ht h es u p e r i o rw o r k e r .
With impersonal price setting followed by matching, there is a pricing equilibrium
in mixed strategies. In this equilibrium, the expected surplus of the better hospital
exceeds that of the lesser hospital by more than the diﬀerence in output with the
superior worker. The reason is that the salary a hospital must oﬀer to obtain in
expectation its appropriately matched resident is less than what the hospital ranked
just below it would have to oﬀer to match in expectation with the same resident.
3Most readers will recognize Bonds as baseball’s greatest player over the past 15 years; Mendoza
is best known for his struggles in keeping his batting average above his weight; a standard that has
become known as the “Mendoza Line”.
2This is because the higher ranked hospital will, on average, oﬀer higher wages than
the lower ranked hospital and therefore the higher ranked hospital faces less stiﬀ
competition than the lower ranked hospital.4 Therefore, the diﬀerence in the expected
surplus of two adjacent hospitals reﬂects the maximum diﬀerential in a competitive
equilibrium, plus the savings from the lower wage that the higher ﬁrm must pay
relative to its near competitor to achieve its expected eﬃcient quality worker.
The incremental surplus diﬀerential between two adjacent hospitals may be small,
but it cumulates: the surplus of a highly ranked hospital exceeds its competitive
surplus by at least the sum of all the incremental diﬀerentials between the hospitals
below it. So the highest ranked hospitals get the most extra surplus. Of course the
entire increase in surplus must come from wages rather than increased productivity,
since the competitive equilibrium is eﬃcient. In fact, given that the pricing and
matching structure allows some ineﬃciency to creep into the match, resident wages
will decline in aggregate by more than the increase in hospital surplus. Because
competition is localized, however – hospitals may oﬀer wages that match them with
residents a bit above or below their competitive match, but no one will oﬀer a wage
that leads to a massively ineﬃcient allocation – the ineﬃciency in the market will
be small. Finally, because the top hospitals gain the most, and they match with the
best residents, the residents whose salaries are most reduced are the very best ones.5
This accounts for the compression in the wage distribution.6
While we frame the paper in terms of the residency match, we do not intend to
cast negative aspersions on the NRMP. First, the match was designed for eﬃciency
purposes; our model suggests that eﬃciency should be high even relative to an ideal-
4To continue with our baseball analogy, the Yankees have an easier schedule than the Tampa Bay
Devil Rays because they face all the same opponents except that the Yankees get to play the Devil
Rays and the Devil Rays must play the Yankees.
5Such as Jon’s wife, Amy, whose long hours inspired his work on this topic.
6One might expect the average wage problem to be mitigated by entry, though compression
would still remain. In the resident market the accreditation process that also limits the size of
residency programs may eﬀectively limit entry. One might also expect the compression problem to
be “relieved” in part by the exodus of high quality workers from the market. Mitigating this, a
residency lasts for a relatively small fraction of most doctors’ careers and part of the lower wages
that residents receive may return to older doctors, meaning that part of the eﬀect of the system may
be a steepening of doctors’ experience-income proﬁle, particularly for the best doctors.
3ized competitive equilibrium.7 Second, we have chosen our assumptions for analytical
simplicity and transparency, not as the most realistic possible model of the residency
match. For instance, we abstract from a broad range of heterogeneity in preferences,
such as locational preferences, that the NRMP process may be well-suited to address.
Our goal is really to make a set of points about markets like the residency market
that share certain salient characteristics. In many professions (law, investment bank-
ing and academic economics being three important examples though not necessarily
in that order) employers may reasonably conclude that it is in their interest to pay
the same wage to all incoming employees. It is this non-discrimination feature that
we regard as the focus of our study.8
The outline of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we present a numerical example
that illustrates the basic results in our model and an approach for solving for equilib-
rium. Section 3 brieﬂy describes the model itself and section 4 describes the pricing
equilibrium. Sections 5 and 6 describe the competitive equilibrium, the high proﬁts,
and the salary compression that the model produces. Section 7 explains why the
market has very good performance in terms of eﬃciency. Section 8 argues that while
s o m eo ft h ew a g ec o m p r e s s i o nw o u l do c c u ri nas y m m e t r i cm o d e li nw h i c hﬁrms are
limited to one wage oﬀer, most of the compression and all of the reduction in average
wages is due to the combination of the one wage restriction and the asymmetry of
the ﬁrms. Section 9 discusses some extensions to the model and concludes.
2. A “Multiplication Game” Example
7In practice, some arguably similar markets without centralized matches perform quite poorly.
See, for example, Avery, Jolls, Posner, and Roth (2001) on the law clerkship market. It is also worth
noting that in the context of medical fellowships, where a centralized matching process is used for
some, but not all sub-specialties, salaries appear to be low across the board and do not seem to
depend much on whether the market is centralized (Niederle and Roth, 2003).
8The model also has some relevance for the study of multi-unit auctions and price discrimination
in product markets (see Bulow and Levin, 2003, for discussion). Within ﬁrms, the model also suggests
why tournaments might allow the most talented workers to obtain the most responsible jobs and a
disproportionate share of the ﬁrm’s surplus. It suggests that adopting such a pay mechanism might
help the ﬁrm attract more of the most talented workers. We have not pursued this extension in any
detail, however.
4Consider a market with N ﬁrms (hospitals) 1,2,...,N, and a corresponding set of
workers (residents), also labeled 1,2,...,N.E a c hﬁrm is interested in matching with
one worker and wants to maximize the value of its output less the amount it pays
its worker. Firm n’s output if it hires worker m has value m · n, so we refer to this
example as the “multiplication game”. Workers are strictly interested in maximizing
their wage and have a reservation wage of zero. All this information is common
knowledge. Here we explicitly solve the example for N =3 .
In a competitive equilibrium, ﬁrms take the wages of each worker as given, each
worker prefers to work, and each ﬁrm hires optimally at the given wages. A com-
petitive equilibrium must have eﬃcient matching, which here means that ﬁrm 1 will
hire worker 1, ﬁrm 2 will hire worker 2 and ﬁrm 3 will hire worker 3. Worker 1’s
wage will be p1 ∈ [0,1], so that ﬁrm and worker 1 each get positive surplus. Worker
2’s wage must be high enough that ﬁrm 1 does not want to pay the extra amount
needed to hire worker 2 over worker 1, but low enough that ﬁr m2d o e sw a n tt op a y
it. Therefore p2−p1 must be greater than 1, ﬁrm 1’s value for the incremental worker
quality, but less than 2. So p2 ∈ [p1 +1 ,p 1 + 2]. Similarly, worker 3’s wage will be
p3 ∈ [p2 +2 ,p 2 +3 ] . The lowest competitive wages are therefore 0,1, and 3. At these
wages the hospitals receive their maximum competitive surpluses of 1,3, and 6.9 The
total surplus is 14.
In our model of the match, each ﬁrm simultaneously oﬀers a wage. These wages
are observed by the workers prior to matching. At the matching stage, each ﬁrm
ranks the workers in order of their ability and each worker ranks the ﬁrms in order of
their oﬀers. Given the alignment of preferences, we do not specify an exact process
for the match (it could for instance be an NRMP-style algorithm); we simply assume
that worker 3 ends up with the ﬁrm that has oﬀered the highest wage, worker 2 with
the ﬁrm that oﬀered the second highest wage, and worker 1 with the ﬁrm oﬀering the
lowest wage. What we will show in the context of this example is a set of results –
sub-competitive average wages, wage compression, and a high level of eﬃciency –
that we generalize later in the paper.
In solving this example, we know immediately that ﬁrms will use mixed strate-
9Because of the symmetry of the problem the highest possible competitive wages are 1,3, and 6
and the lowest hospital surpluses are 0,1, and 3.
5gies.10 If there were a pure strategy equilibrium, the middle bidder would oﬀer only
a fraction of a penny above the low bidder and the high bidder only a fraction of
a penny above the medium bidder. But then the lower two bidders would beneﬁt
by raising their bids to attract the top worker. This same logic implies that in a
mixed equilibrium there will be no “atoms” in ﬁrm strategies, except possibly at a
salary of zero. We also know that zero must be the lowest salary oﬀered. A ﬁrm
making the lowest oﬀer is sure to obtain the lowest worker, so having the lowest oﬀer
be strictly positive is inconsistent with proﬁt maximization.11 What is more, every
salary between zero and the maximum must be potentially oﬀered by at least two
ﬁrms. If no ﬁrms make oﬀers on some range of salaries, no ﬁrm will make an oﬀer at
the top of the range as it would prefer to make an oﬀer at the bottom. Similarly, if
only one ﬁrm makes oﬀers on some range, it would do better to always make oﬀers
at the bottom of the range. Finally, we prove in the Appendix that each ﬁrm will
randomize over an interval of prices.
Given these preliminaries, the only real issue is whether at the top and bottom
wages only two or all three ﬁrms will randomize. It is easiest to start at the top. If
only two ﬁrms randomize over the highest wages, it must be ﬁrms 2 and 3 because
they care more about quality. If they are the only active ﬁrms, they must randomize
with densities q2 = 1
3 and q3 = 1
2 in order that both are indiﬀe r e n to v e rm a k i n g
10An alternative approach would be to allow some randomness in hospital valuations, so that
for example hospital j might value an extra unit of worker quality as an amount in the range
[j,j + ], ≤ 1, the exact amount known only to it. This would still allow for unambiguous rankings
of hospitals and would not aﬀect the expected competitive equilibrium prices, but would imply
that each hospital would choose a pure strategy, bidding an amount that looked random to its
competitors but was based on the hospital’s private information about its value. In the limit as
  → 0 the equilibrium of the pure strategy game would be just the equilibrium of the mixed strategy
game. The reason we take the mixed strategy approach is that it leads to simpler exposition and
cleaner proofs. In the mixed strategy equilibrium hospitals choose piecewise linear bidding strategies,
while the pure strategy equilibrium is characterized by the piecewise solution of sets of non-linear
diﬀerential equations. Michael Grubb used Matlab to calculate the equilibrium in the pure strategy
game with   =1 , a n dw i t hd i ﬀerent numbers of ﬁrms. The numerical results extremely similar to
the mixed strategy equilibrium and virtually the same with larger numbers of ﬁrms.
11To nail down this argument we must account for the possibility that some ﬁrms oﬀer the lowest
salary with discrete possibility. There cannot be two ﬁrms with “atoms” at the bottom, however,
or one would want to bid a bit higher; and if there is just one, our argument applies to this ﬁrm.
6diﬀerent oﬀers in the range. Because q3 + q2 = 5
6, ﬁrm 1 gains less than one unit of
quality for every extra dollar spent in this range, so it has no incentive to compete
against ﬁrms 2 and 3 at the highest salary levels.12
Because q3 = 1
2 >q 2 the range of wages over which 2 and 3 randomize must be
from the maximum wage, call it p,d o w nt op − 2. Within the range [ p − 2, p] ﬁrm
3 will exhaust its total bidding probability (a density of 1
2 times a range of 2).Firm
2, however, will exhaust only 2
3 of its probability (a density of 1
3 over a range of 2).
This leaves ﬁrm 2 with a probability mass of 1
3 to employ over a range in which it
competes with ﬁrm 1.
I nt h er a n g ew h e r e1a n d2c o m p e t eq1 = 1
2 and q2 = 1 to make the other indiﬀerent
between making diﬀerent oﬀers. Given 2’s density and its available probability the
length of the range must be 1
3. Since we know that the minimum wage must be zero,
t h i sm e a n st h a t1a n d2c o m p e t ei nar a n g eo f( 0 , 1
3] and therefore 2 and 3 compete in
a range of [1
3, 7
3]. Competing with ﬁrm 2 over the range (0, 1














Figure 1: Equilibrium in the Multiplication Game
12Another way to say this is to note that if we solved for the q1,q 2 and q3 densities that would
simultaneously make all ﬁrms indiﬀerent across a range of prices, we would ﬁnd q1 < 0.
7The equilibrium in the three-ﬁrm example can be summarized as follows, with
comparison to the competitive equilibrium that is most favorable to the ﬁrms in
parentheses:
Table 1. The Multiplication Game
Wages Proﬁts
Worker 1 0.02 (0) Firm 1 1.00 (1)
Worker 2 0.73 (1) Firm 2 3.67 (3)
Worker 3 1.56 (3) Firm 3 6.67 (6)
Total 2.31 (4) Total 11.33 (10)
The key results that will hold more generally are that wages are reduced and
compressed but that the match is pretty eﬃcient. In the example, almost four ﬁfths of
the reduction in expected wages goes to increased proﬁts, while one ﬁfth is deadweight
loss. Results are similar with larger numbers of ﬁrms. In the multiplication game
with N = 16 expected output in our game declines from a competitive level of 1496 to
1487, while wages decline by over twenty times that amount, from between 680 and
816 in a competitive equilibrium to 496. By comparison, collusion among the ﬁrms
on a zero wage and random assignment of workers would yield 50 cents of eﬃciency
loss for every dollar of wage decline.13
Not only do ﬁrms do better on average than in competitive equilibrium, every
ﬁrm beneﬁts. In the ﬁrm optimal competitive equilibrium, ﬁrm n hires worker n at
a competitive salary pn,l e a v i n gi tw i t hp r o ﬁt n · n − pn.I nt h em a t c h ,ﬁrm n may
not get worker n, but there is a price ˆ pn in the support of ﬁrm n’s oﬀer distribution
at which ﬁrm n gets worker n in expectation. Therefore ﬁrm n’s equilibrium proﬁt
is n · n − ˆ pn and the diﬀerence between n’s equilibrium proﬁta n di t sc o m p e t i t i v e
proﬁti spn − ˆ pn . We found above that (p1,p 2,p 3)=( 0 ,1,3), while in the match
(ˆ p1, ˆ p2, ˆ p3)=( 0 ,1/3,7/3). So pn − ˆ pn ≥ 0a n de v e r yﬁr mm a k e se x c e s sp r o ﬁt.
We want to explain why this is true and why the diﬀerence is larger for higher-
ranked ﬁrms. Firm 1 is easy. In the match equilibrium, ﬁr m1g e t sw o r k e r1f o rs u r e
by oﬀering ˆ p1 = 0, which is also the price for worker 1 in competitive equilibrium.
13One might argue that any reasonable centralized market mechanism would probably do very
well compared to a random match, so that the real eﬃciency of an NRMP-type system is its ability
to create such a market. Our point here is that the ratio of the amount redistributed from workers
to ﬁrms to the amount of ineﬃciency is very large.
8So ˆ p1 = p1. Now the key feature of (the lowest) competitive prices is that each ﬁrm
n−1 is indiﬀerent between paying pn to hire worker n and paying pn−1 to hire worker
n − 1. Thus pn − pn−1 = ∆n−1 · [n − (n − 1)] = ∆n−1. In the match, the prices
ˆ pn−1 and ˆ pn a r eb o t hi nt h es u p p o r to fﬁrm n −1’s oﬀers, so ﬁrm n −1i si n d i ﬀerent
between oﬀering ˆ pn−1 and oﬀering ˆ pn.B u tw h i l ep a y i n gˆ pn−1 allows ﬁrm n−1t og e t
worker n − 1 in expectation, paying ˆ pn gets ﬁrm n − 1 an expected quality less than
n. For instance, ﬁrm 1 expects worker quality 1/3 if it oﬀers ˆ p2 =1 /3. The reason
ﬁrm n − 1 expects lower quality than ﬁrm n conditional on oﬀering ˆ pn (or any other
price) is that in equilibrium ﬁrm n makes higher oﬀers than ﬁrm n−1, so n−1f a c e s
tougher competition. The upshot is that ˆ pn − ˆ pn−1 = ∆n−1 ·[ξn−1,n −(n−1)], where
ξn−1,n is the expected worker quality that ﬁrm n−1g e t sb yo ﬀering ˆ pn. But because
ξn−1,n ≤ n, it follows that ˆ pn − ˆ pn−1 ≤ pn − pn−1.
This logic demonstrates several points that will be true more generally. First,
because ˆ p1 = p1 and ˆ pn − ˆ pn−1 ≤ pn −pn−1,e v e r yﬁrm makes at least as high a proﬁt
in the match as it does in a competitive equilibrium. Second, the price diﬀerentials
cumulate, so that ﬁrm n makes all the additional proﬁto fﬁrm n−1 plus a little more.
Finally, the price diﬀerence for the top two ﬁrms is the same as in the competitive
equilibrium. Because ˆ pN must be the highest price oﬀered in equilibrium, ﬁrm N −1
and ﬁrm N both expect to get the highest ranked worker by oﬀering this price, so
ˆ pN − ˆ pN−1 = pN − pN−1. Apart from this, the diﬀerences are strict so long as the
ﬁrms have diﬀerent values for worker quality.
Another way to think of why the price a ﬁrm will pay for high quality will be low
is to think about the equilibrium conditions that determine the price that workers
can expect to receive for providing higher quality. In the three-ﬁrm example, ﬁrm
1 would not bid against 2 and 3 because the implicit price of increasing its quality
was between 1 and 2 (1.2). In a 100 ﬁrm example, ﬁrm 100 competes only against
ﬁrms 87 to 99 for the top worker, which means that the implicit price of quality for
a non-bidder in the region is between 86 and 87. In a competitive equilibrium, we
would observe ﬁr m1 0 0p a y i n gp r i c e so f8 7t o9 9t ob e a to u tt h e s es a m ec o m p e t i t o r s .
T h ef a c tt h a th i g h e r - r a n k e dﬁrms make higher oﬀers in equilibrium also leads to
relatively eﬃcient equilibrium matching. The key force here is that ﬁrms compete
directly only against ﬁrms that are similar, so competiti o ni sl o c a l i z e d .I nt h et h r e e
ﬁrm example, ﬁrm 3 always makes a higher oﬀer than ﬁrm 1, so the best worker
9can fall only one place from his eﬃcient assignment. With a hundred ﬁrms, ﬁrm 100
always makes a higher oﬀer than ﬁrms 1 through 86, so the best worker can fall no
more than 13 places. In this case, ﬁrm 100 obtains an average quality of 96.75, and
all other ﬁrms attain something even closer to their eﬃcient quality. This suggests
that larger markets will be very eﬃcient, a point we develop in Section 7.
3. The Model
Our general model has N ﬁrms and N workers.14 Each ﬁrm wants to hire a single
worker. Firm n’s surplus from hiring worker m is v(n,m)=∆n · m,w h e r e∆N ≥
... ≥ ∆1 ≥ 0. Each ﬁrm that hires a worker pays a salary. If ﬁrm n hires worker m at
as a l a r yp, ﬁrm n’s net utility is v(n,m) − p, while worker m’s utility is p.Aﬁrm or
worker that fails to match receives zero utility. These preferences, and the workers’
abilities, are commonly known to the ﬁrms.
The market unfolds in three stages. Each ﬁrm simultaneously makes a salary oﬀer.
These oﬀers are observed by the workers. Matching follows. Workers rank ﬁrms by
their oﬀers, so the ﬁrm that makes the highest oﬀer obtains the most able worker, and
so on. To resolve ties, we assume that if several ﬁrms oﬀer the same salary, matching
is eﬃcient – the ﬁrm with the highest value for talent gets the preferred worker.
Once matching occurs, each ﬁrm pays its worker the salary it initially oﬀered. In
a pricing equilibrium,e a c hﬁrm chooses its oﬀer to maximize its expected surplus,
taking into account the matching process and the strategies of other ﬁrms. Note that
each ﬁrm is implicitly required to rank all workers, so that every ﬁrm will match with
a worker. This assumption is inconsequential in the multiplication game, but one can
construct examples where it is relevant for lower ranked ﬁrms.15
Before solving for equilibrium, several points deserve emphasis. First, the model
allows some or all of the ﬁrms to have identical value for worker quality. The most
14It is a simple generalization to make the number of ﬁrms and workers diﬀerent. Excess workers
simply would not match, so they are irrelevant. Excess ﬁrms force the minimum wage up to the
minimum competitive equilibrium wage for the bottom worker who matches, and therefore raise all
wages by exactly that amount.
15We thank Jeﬀrey Ely and Amy Finkelstein for bringing this point to our attention. Our working
paper, Bulow and Levin (2003), provides a numerical example where ﬁrms may opt to pay nothing
and not match ex post.
10notable results, however, arise when there is some asymmetry between ﬁrms. Second,
the multiplicative form of match surplus usefully simpliﬁes the equilibrium, but is not
essential. What is important is that v is increasing in m, so that workers are ranked
in terms of their ability, and that v has increasing diﬀerences in n and m,s ot h a t
ﬁrms are ranked in terms of how they value talent.
Finally, we emphasize that although we model salaries as prices, we think of
each salary as encompassing job features such as responsibility, hours and training.
Indeed, one can view part of each ﬁrm’s expenditure on its worker as an investment
that makes the ﬁrm more attractive to workers.16 It is also plausible that some
ﬁrms are naturally more attractive to workers, and a simple version of this can be
accommodated as well. If all workers derive additional utility un from working for
ﬁrm n,w ec a nl e tpn denote the total utility ﬁrm n oﬀers, of which it pays pn − un
as compensation. This modiﬁcation will not change either the competitive equilibria
or the pricing and matching equilibrium.17 This being said, the model nonetheless is
somewhat restrictive in assuming that workers have homogenous preferences rather
than allowing for a broader degree of idiosyncrasy. We return to this point in the
concluding section.
4. Pricing and Matching
This section describes equilibrium salary oﬀers. We start with the basic structure
of the equilibrium, then proceed to the details. We defer a few technicalities to the
Appendix.
The equilibrium, as in our example, involves mixed strategies. A mixed strategy
for ﬁrm n is a distribution Gn,w h e r eGn(p) is the probability that n oﬀers a salary
less than or equal to p.W el e tgn denote the density for ﬁrm n’s oﬀer distribution. As
argued in the example, no ﬁrm can oﬀer a price above zero with discrete probability.
16In the medical residency case, the investment might be improved facilities, better senior physi-
cians, more time for research or didactics, or more hospital support staﬀ to relieve the administrative
burden shared by residents.
17It may be useful, however, for squaring the model with reality. For example, if un is viewed
as a career beneﬁt from being placed at ﬁrm n, the model could be consistent with a top-ranked
university oﬀering a relatively low salary and still attracting outstanding junior faculty.
11Also, we prove in the Appendix that in equilibrium each ﬁrm must randomize over
an interval of prices.
We ﬁrst establish the key qualitative feature of the equilibrium: higher ranked
ﬁrms make (stochastically) higher oﬀers.
Lemma 1 If ∆n ≥ ∆m, then in equilibrium ﬁrm n makes higher oﬀers than ﬁrm
min the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance; for all p, Gn(p) ≤ Gm(p).
Proof. Consider the returns to ﬁrm n to oﬀering p + dp rather than p.T h e
beneﬁt is the expected increase in worker quality, equal to ∆n ·
P
k6=n gk(p) · dp.T h e
cost is the additional salary dp. Compare this to the returns to ﬁrm m<n .B e c a u s e
∆m ≤ ∆n,t h eo n l yw a yﬁrm m could have a greater (or even equal) incentive to make
the higher oﬀer is if gn(p) ≥ gm(p). Now suppose that in equilibrium ﬁrm nmakes
oﬀers over some interval [p0,p 00]. Since ﬁrm n prefers oﬀering p00 to any higher price
and gn(p)=0a b o v ep00, ﬁrm mmust also prefer p00 to any higher price. Between p0
and p00, ﬁrm n is indiﬀerent. This means that if ﬁrm m’s oﬀer interval overlaps with
ﬁrm n’s, then for any price p oﬀered by both ﬁrms, gm(p) ≤ gn(p). Below p0, ﬁrm n
never makes oﬀers, but ﬁrm m might. If follows that 1 − Gn(p) ≥ 1 − Gm(p) for all
p, establishing the claim. Q.E.D.
The logic behind Lemma 1 is that oﬀering a higher salary attracts a more qualiﬁed
worker (at least in expectation), but the higher salary must be paid regardless. Firms
that care more about quality focus more on the beneﬁt and make higher oﬀers. If two
ﬁrms are symmetric, so ∆n = ∆m, then they use the same equilibrium strategy. But
if ∆n > ∆m,t h e nn uses a strictly higher strategy: Gn(p) <G m(p) for all p between
the lowest price oﬀered by m and the highest oﬀered by n.
The monotonicity property means that, in equilibrium, ﬁrms make oﬀers over






Figure 2: Price Supports
Now consider the “head-to-head” competition that occurs at some given price p.
If p is oﬀered in equilibrium, it is oﬀered by a consecutive set of ﬁrms l,...,m.E a c h
of these ﬁrms must be just indiﬀerent to changing its oﬀer slightly away from p.S o





By solving this system of equations, we obtain the ﬁrms’ oﬀer densities at p.F o r












Conveniently, the oﬀer densities depend on the set of ﬁrms competing, but not on
p.18 Taking advantage of this, we deﬁne qn(l,m)t ob eﬁrm n’s oﬀer density given
ﬁrms l,...,m are competing. Note that qn(l,m)i si n c r e a s i n gi nn; that is, higher ﬁrms
“drop out” at a faster rate.
O u rn e x tL e m m ar e s o l v e st h eq u e s t i o no fw h i c hﬁrms compete head-to-head.
18This is where the linear form of the surplus function comes into play: the incremental beneﬁt
to getting worker 3 rather than 2 is the same as from getting 2 rather than 1.
13Lemma 2 If ﬁrm m is the highest-ranked ﬁrm that oﬀers p,t h e nﬁrms l(m),...,m
all oﬀer p,w h e r e :
l(m)≡min{l : ql(l,m)>0}. (2)
So if ﬁrm m is the highest ranked ﬁrm to oﬀer p,w ec a nw r i t ee a c hﬁrm n’s oﬀer
density at p as qn(m), where qn(m) ≡ qn(l(m),m)i fl(m) ≤ n ≤ m,a n dqn(m) ≡ 0
otherwise.
With these preliminaries, we can provide an algorithm to describe equilibrium
behavior. The algorithm generalizes thea p p r o a c hw eu s e dt os o l v et h en u m e r i c a l
example of the previous section. We will let pN+1 denote the highest salary oﬀered,
and pn denote the lowest salary oﬀered by ﬁrm n.
As in our earlier example, the algorithm starts at the top. On the interval below
pN+1, ﬁrms l(N),...,N compete head-to-head; and each ﬁrm’s oﬀer density is given
by qn(N). Now, because qN(N) ≥ qn(N)f o ra l ln, ﬁrm N will “use up” its oﬀer
probability below pN+1 faster than other ﬁrms. So this top interval will have length
1/qN(N). Or, letting pN denote the lowest price oﬀered by N,
qN(N) · (pN+1 − pN)=1 .
What happens just below pN? Provided that the ﬁrms are not all identical, lower-
ranked ﬁrms will have residual oﬀer probability that is not used up between pN and
pN+1. Suppose for instance that ∆N−1 < ∆N.T h e nb e l o wpN, ﬁrms l(N−1),...,N−1
compete head-to-head; and each ﬁrm’s oﬀer density is given by qn(N − 1).
More generally, suppose ﬁrms m +1 ,...,N “use up” their oﬀer probability above
pm+1,b u tﬁrm m does not. Then between pm and pm+1, ﬁrms l(m),...,m compete
head-to-head; and each ﬁrm’s oﬀer density is given by qn(m). Firm m will use up its
oﬀer probability at its lowest oﬀer pm.B yr e c u r s i o n ,
X
n≥m
qm(n) · (pn+1 − pn)=1 .
Given a starting point pN+1, this process continues until we have speciﬁed the
behavior of ﬁrms 2,...,N. At this point, there are two possibilities. If ∆1 = ∆2,t h e n
ﬁrms 1 and 2 must use identical strategies, so we have also speciﬁed ﬁrm 1’s behavior.
14If ∆1 < ∆2,t h e nﬁrm 1 has some residual probability, so it oﬀers the lowest price
with discrete probability equal to:
G1(0) = 1 −
N X
n=2
q1(n) · (pn+1 − pn).
In either case, the lowest price oﬀered by the two lowest ﬁrms must be zero, so
p1 = p2 = 0. Given this, we complete the derivation by adding up the diﬀerences
pn+1 − pn to obtain the highest price pN+1.
Proposition 1 There is a unique pricing equilibrium. Letting qn(·) and p1,...,p N+1
and G1(0) be deﬁned as above, then for each ﬁrm n, and each non-empty interval
[pm,p m+1], gn(p)=qn(m) for all p ∈ (pm,p m+1].
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium oﬀer distributions with ﬁve ﬁrms (using mul-
tiplication game payoﬀs). Only two ﬁrms mix concurrently over the lowest range of
prices, but more than two ﬁr m sm a ym i xo v e rh i g h e rr a n g e so fp r i c e s . I n d e e dt h e
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Firm 4:
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1
Figure 3: Equilibrium with Five Firms
19In general, the “pool size” increases over the price range provided that ∆n is concave in n (or
at least less convex than an exponential curve xn).
155. Competitive Equilibria
In the model, as in the residency match, ﬁrms make salary oﬀers prior to match-
ing. An alternative would be to negotiate salaries in the process of matching. This
section describes the competitive equilibria that might arise from an idealized form of
negotiations and relates them to the Vickrey auction and a pricing equilibrium with
discriminatory oﬀers.
A competitive equilibrium is a matching of ﬁrms and workers, and a salary for
each worker, that satisﬁes two conditions. First, it is individually rational; each ﬁrm
and worker get at least zero utility. Second, at the going worker salaries, each ﬁrm
prefers the worker with which it is matched to any other worker.
There are a range of competitive equilibria. Each involves eﬃcient matching, but
salaries vary. Extending our earlier example, ﬁrm 1 must pay worker 1 an individually
rational salary p1 ∈ [0,∆1]. Also the additional salary of worker n over worker n − 1
must be such that ﬁrm n−1 prefers to hire worker n−1 while ﬁrm n prefers worker n.
So for each n, pn −pn−1 ∈ [∆n−1,∆n]. This puts a bound on competitive equilibrium
salaries. Firm n must pay at least pF
n =
P




From the ﬁrms’ perspective, the best competitive equilibrium has salaries pF
1 ,...,pF
N;
the worst has salaries pW
1 ,...,pW
N .
The ﬁrm-optimal competitive equilibrium is the same outcome one would get from
a Vickrey auction where the ﬁrms submit their values to a planner who eﬃciently
allocates the workers and sets prices so that each ﬁrm’s proﬁt equals its marginal
contribution to social surplus. For this reason, we refer to ﬁrm n’s proﬁti nt h e
ﬁrm-preferred competitive equilibrium as its Vickrey proﬁt.
The Vickrey or ﬁrm-optimal competitive outcome also arises as the equilibrium of
the pricing followed by matching model if ﬁrms are allowed to make discriminatory
oﬀers. In this version of the model, each ﬁrm n makes a contingent oﬀer to each
worker, so ﬁrm n’s oﬀer is a vector pn =( pn1,...,pnn). Matching follows taking these
prices as ﬁxed. Assuming the matching process always leads to a stable matching,
Bulow and Levin (2003) show that any equilibrium in prices that does not involve
weakly dominated strategies leads to the ﬁrm-optimal competitive equilibrium.
6. Proﬁts and Salaries
16This section compares ﬁrm proﬁts and worker salaries in our model to competitive
equilibrium proﬁts and salaries. We obtain three main results. First, each ﬁrm’s
equilibrium proﬁti sat least as large as its proﬁt in any competitive equilibrium.
Second, worker salaries are lower in aggregate than their competitive salaries. Finally,
worker salaries are compressed. Relative to competitive equilibrium, the worst worker
may beneﬁt from the pricing and matching system, but salaries at the top are reduced.
We start with ﬁrm proﬁts. Let Πn(p)d e n o t eﬁrm n’s expected proﬁti fi to ﬀers
pand other ﬁrms use their equilibrium strategies:








If ﬁrm n oﬀers p, it expects to attract a worker quality of 1+
P
k6=n Gk(p) and to pay
p.20
Firm n’s equilibrium proﬁt Πn is equal to Πn(p)f o ra n yp in the support of n’s
equilibrium strategy. In contrast, ﬁrm n’s maximum competitive proﬁt, or Vickrey
proﬁt, is equal to:




These two proﬁts are exactly equal for the lowest ranked ﬁrm. In equilibrium,
ﬁrm 1 is willing to oﬀer zero and receive the lowest worker with certainty, so Π1 =
Π1(0) = ∆1. Similarly V1 = ∆1.
To compare proﬁts more generally, we consider the proﬁtd i ﬀerential between
adjacent ﬁrms. Let ˆ pn denote the price such that if ﬁrm n oﬀers ˆ pn, its expected
worker quality is n, its Vickrey quality. Such a price must exist in n’s oﬀer region:
when n makes its highest oﬀer, it expects to beat all ﬁrms k<nwith certainty and
obtain at least worker n; on the other hand, when n makes its lowest oﬀer, it expects
to lose to all ﬁrms k>nw i t hc e r t a i n t ya n do b t a i nn ob e t t e rt h a nw o r k e rn.S oˆ p
must lie between these two extremes. Moreover, ﬁrm n−1m u s ta l s oo ﬀer ˆ pn,o re l s e
n would expect quality strictly greater than n when it oﬀered ˆ pn.
20To see that ﬁrm n’s expected worker quality is 1 +
P
k6=n Gk(p), note that n will get worker 1
if p is the lowest oﬀer and will move up one worker for every competing ﬁrm that makes an oﬀer
below p. The competing oﬀers are independent and the probability that k makes an oﬀer below p is
Gk(p).
17The diﬀerence in equilibrium proﬁts between ﬁrms n and n−1i sΠn(ˆ pn)−Πn−1(ˆ pn).
Noting that oﬀering ˆ pn gets ﬁrm n an expected worker quality of n and ﬁrm n−1a n
expected worker quality of n + Gn(ˆ pn) − Gn−1(ˆ pn), we have
Πn − Πn−1 = ∆n · n − ∆n−1 · [n + Gn(ˆ pn) − Gn−1(ˆ pn)].
Substituting and re-arranging,
Πn − Πn−1 =( ∆n − ∆n−1) · n + ∆n−1 · [Gn−1(ˆ pn) − Gn(ˆ pn)].
The ﬁrst term is exactly Vn−Vn−1,t h ed i ﬀerence in the Vickrey proﬁts of n and n−1.
The bracketed part of the second term is the diﬀerence between the worker quality
that ﬁrms n and n − 1 expect conditional on oﬀering ˆ pn; the entire second term is
the value of this diﬀerence to ﬁrm n−1. Because ﬁrm n−1m a k e sl o w e ro ﬀers than
ﬁrm n in equilibrium, it expects lower worker quality than does ﬁrm n conditional
on oﬀering ˆ pn, so the second term is positive and is strictly positive provided that
∆n > ∆n−1 and ˆ p<p.T h e r e f o r e Πn − Πn−1 ≥ Vn − Vn−1, typically with strict
inequality.
So equilibrium proﬁt and Vickrey proﬁt are the same for the lowest ﬁrm, but
if ∆2 > ∆1, ﬁrm two’s equilibrium proﬁt is strictly higher than its Vickrey proﬁt,
and the same is true for every ﬁrm n>2. Moreover, if ∆n+1 > ∆n, the diﬀerence
between the Πn and Vn increases for higher ranked ﬁrms. For the very top two ﬁrms,
the diﬀerence ceases to increase. That is, the extra proﬁtt h a tﬁrm N makes over
ﬁrm N −1 in equilibrium is the same as the diﬀerence between their Vickrey proﬁts.
This occurs because ˆ pN = p,a n dGN−1(p)=GN(p)=1 .
We summarize as follows.
Proposition 2 All ﬁrms have expected equilibrium proﬁts greater than their Vickrey
proﬁts. Moreover, the diﬀerence cumulates: the lowest ﬁrm obtains no extra proﬁt,
while the highest ﬁrm sees the biggest increase.
To re-iterate, the key force is that low ranked ﬁrms are less aggressive in equilib-
rium than high ranked ﬁrms. So ﬁrm n not only derives greater value from a given
worker than ﬁrm n − 1, it also expects, conditional on oﬀering a given salary, to
receive a better worker. This creates a larger proﬁtd i ﬀerential between ﬁrms than in
18a competitive equilibrium where n’s extra proﬁtr e l a t i v et on − 1 cannot exceed the
diﬀerence in their values for worker n.
Now consider the workers’ perspective. Because there is mixing, ﬁrms and workers
may not be eﬃciently matched. So the expected equilibrium surplus is less than the
eﬃcient competitive equilibrium surplus. Because ﬁrm proﬁts are higher, worker
salaries must be lower in the aggregate.
Not every worker is necessarily worse oﬀ. T h ew o r s tw o r k e re x p e c t san o n - z e r o
salary in equilibrium, which improves on her Vickrey salary of zero (though it may
or may not be lower than her highest possible competitive salary). The best worker,
however, not only expects a lower than competitive salary, in equilibrium she never
receives an oﬀer as high as her lowest possible competitive salary. We provide some
quantitative examples in the next section to show that this diﬀerence is often quite
large.
Proposition 3 The aggregate surplus that accrues to workers in equilibrium is strictly
less than in any competitive allocation. Moreover, wages are compressed; the worst
worker does better and the best worker does worse than under competition.
Propositions 2 and 3 generalize to the case where match surplus is not simply
multiplicative. Suppose that ﬁrm n’s value for worker m is given by v(n,m), where v is
increasing in m and has increasing diﬀerences in (n,m). (Recall that v has increasing
diﬀerences if for all m0 >m , v(n,m0)−v(n,m)i si n c r e a s i n gi nn.) This speciﬁcation
includes the multiplicative case v(n,m)=∆n · m, as well as cases where ﬁrms have
increasing or decreasing returns to worker quality. We show in the Appendix that the
qualitative features of the equilibrium are preserved in this more general model and
establish the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose ﬁrm values are given by v(n,m), where v is increasing in m
and has increasing diﬀerences in (n,m). Then equilibrium ﬁrm proﬁts exceed Vickrey
proﬁts, while equilibrium worker salaries are less than Vickrey salaries on aggregate
and more compressed.
7. Local Competition and Eﬃciency
19This section examines market eﬃciency. Low-ranked ﬁrms may outbid higher-
ranked ﬁrms in equilibrium, but because ﬁrms compete “locally” against similar op-
ponents, the ineﬃciency this creates is limited. Relative to competitive equilibrium,
there is far more redistribution of surplus than loss of surplus. To expand on this
point, we approximate both market eﬃciency and ﬁrm proﬁts and show that the
surplus redistribution is an order of magnitude larger than market ineﬃciency.
We focus for simplicity on the case where ﬁrm values are ∆n = n/N2,s oam a t c h
between ﬁrm n and worker m generates surplus v(n,m)=( m · n)/N 2.21 The nor-
malization ensures that each match generates a surplus between 0 and 1, and that
an eﬃcient assignment always generates a per-ﬁrm surplus of approximately 1/3p r o -
vided N is suﬃciently large.22 This set-up is equivalent to one where both ﬁrm
values and worker qualities are uniformly located on the unit interval at locations
1/N, 2/N,...,N/N. In the latter interpretation, a larger market is one where the
spacing of both ﬁr m sa n dw o r k e r si sd e n s e r .
We ﬁrst address the extent to which competition is local. As part of our derivation
of equilibrium, we characterized the highest and lowest-ranked ﬁrms that make any
given oﬀer. We show in the Appendix that if ﬁrm n is the lowest ﬁrm to make some
oﬀer p, then the highest ﬁrm to oﬀer p is approximately n+
√
2n. That is, the number
of higher-ranked ﬁrms that ﬁrm ncould conceivably outbid – the “pool size” of ﬁrm
n – is roughly
√
2n.




¯ ¯ < 1.
Now consider the expected eﬃciency loss in equilibrium relative to an eﬃcient
assortative match. If ﬁrm n makes a higher oﬀer than ﬁrm m>nin equilibrium,
this creates a surplus loss of ∆m − ∆n (because this “switch” moves n up one unit
of worker quality, generating an additional ∆n in surplus, but moves m down a
corresponding unit, costing ∆m). The expected per-ﬁrm ineﬃciency in equilibrium is
the cost generated by all such displacements, weighted by the probability that they
21The results in this section generalize, with similar conclusions, provided 1/∆n is convex in n.









3. Here and below we















(∆n+k − ∆n) · Pr[n beats n + k].
Our pool size result implies that the probability that ﬁrm n beats ﬁrm n + k
must be zero for any k>ρ (n). Moreover, for any 0 <k<ρ (n), we know that in
equilibrium ﬁrm n + k must make stochastically higher oﬀers than ﬁrm n. Therefore
1/2 provides a (very) conservative upper bound on the probability that ﬁrm n beats
ﬁrm n + k. Using these observations to substitute for the probabilities in the above






















That is, the per-ﬁrm ineﬃciency disappears at a fast 1/N rate. As we noted, the
approximation is conservative; our numerical calculations suggest somewhat less in-
eﬃciency, though of the same order of magnitude.
Next consider the magnitude of redistribution. From the previous section we know
that
Πn − Vn =
n−1 X
m=1
∆m · [Gm(ˆ pm+1) − Gm+1(ˆ pm+1)].
How large is the diﬀerence between Gm(ˆ pm+1)a n dGm+1(ˆ pm+1)? Intuitively, in a
large market, the support of ﬁrm m’s oﬀer distribution is very nearly [pm,p m+ρ(m)],
with ˆ pm at the midpoint of this support. If we approximate the density of ﬁrm m’s
oﬀer distribution as being linearly increasing, so gm(p)=
p−pm
pm+ρ(m)−pm (other functional
forms such as a uniform density yield the same answer), we ﬁnd that Gm(ˆ pm+1) −
Gm+1(ˆ pm+1)i so ft h eo r d e r1 /ρ(m). This intuitive argument is conﬁrmed by numerical
simulations. Thus


















This already provides a rough sense of equilibrium wage compression. In a market
with N ﬁrms and workers, with ∆n = n/N2, the competitive equilibrium salary of
worker N is at least 1 − VN = 1
2 − 1
2N. In contrast, the highest salary that could
21possibly be oﬀered to worker N in equilibrium is 1 − ΠN.T h e d i ﬀerence between
























As the number of ﬁrms becomes large, the per-ﬁrm excess proﬁts disappear, but at
a1 /
√
N rate that is much slower than the rate at which the per-ﬁrm ineﬃciency
disappears. The amount by which the average worker salary falls relative to the
competitive benchmark, E(N)+I(N), also disappears at the slower 1/
√
N rate.
So relative to competitive equilibrium, proﬁts rise and salaries fall by an order of
magnitude more than the change in surplus. In this sense, equilibrium generates far
more re-distribution than ineﬃciency. We summarize the discussion in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that ∆n = n/N2. As the market size increases, the per-
ﬁrm ineﬃciency is of the order 1/N, while the amounts by which the average ﬁrm
proﬁt exceeds the competitive level and the average worker salary falls short of the
competitive level are of the order 1/
√
N.
As the market becomes very large, equilibrium becomes approximately eﬃcient
in the sense that virtually 100% of the total possible surplus is realized. Indeed, in
the limiting case when ﬁrm values and worker qualities are continuously distributed
on the unit interval, there is a pure strategy equilibrium in which each ﬁrm oﬀers the
salary it would pay in the ﬁrm-optimal competitive equilibrium, or Vickrey allocation.
It is perhaps useful to calibrate the magnitude of our results for reasonably sized
markets. To this end, assume ﬁrm values are ∆n = 100n/N2, where we multiply by
1 0 0t oa v o i dm e s s yd e c i m a l s . A st h en u m b e ro fﬁrms increases from 10 to 100 to
1000, the per-ﬁrm eﬃcient surplus stays roughly constant (38.5 with 10 ﬁrms, 33.8
with 10 ﬁrms and 33.4 with 1000 ﬁrms), as does the average ﬁrm Vickrey proﬁt( 2 2
with 10 ﬁrms, 17.2 with 100 ﬁrms and 16.7 with 1000 ﬁrms). The ineﬃciency from a
match equilibrium falls rapidly from 0.4 per ﬁrm to 0.03 to 0.003, so that with 100
ﬁrms the ineﬃciency already is less than 1% of the possible surplus. Excess proﬁts
22also fall, from 4.8 per ﬁrm to 2.2 to 0.8, but more slowly. With 100 ﬁrms, the average
ﬁrm makes an equilibrium proﬁt that is 13% more than its Vickrey proﬁt.
As discussed above, the gains and losses are largest at the top. With 100 ﬁrms,
the top ﬁrm expects a proﬁt of 55.2 in the match and 50.5 in the Vickrey auction,
more than twice the extra proﬁto ft h ea v e r a g eﬁrm. The top worker expects a wage
of 49.5 in the Vickrey auction, and 43.9 in the match. This wage reduction is similar
to what the top worker would suﬀer if the six top ﬁrms in the Vickrey auction, with
values of 95 to 100, were replaced by ﬁrms who had values of zero. In absolute terms,
her salary is depressed two and a half times the amount of the average worker.
8. The Role of Nondiscrimination
It is tempting to attribute our results entirely to the fact that ﬁrms do not target
their salary oﬀers. On this account, ﬁrms are less aggressive because they must make
oﬀers without knowing precisely whom they are hiring. This argument is incomplete,
however. While nondiscrimination does generate salary compression, it cannot on its
own account for an aggregate reduction in salaries. Rather, it is the combination of
the salary-setting process and asymmetries between ﬁrms that depresses competition.
It is perhaps easiest to see this in the context of an example. Imagine two worlds.
In the ﬁrst, ﬁrms draw their values independently and privately from a uniform dis-
tribution on [0,N +1 ] . I nt h es e c o n d ,ﬁrm values are drawn without replacement
from {1,2,...,N}. The latter is our multiplication game model.
The environments are parallel in the following sense. In both, the expected value
of the top ﬁrm is N, the expected value of the second ﬁrm is N − 1, and so on.
Moreover, the Vickrey allocations are identical in expectation. The nth ﬁrm has
expected value n, matches with worker n, and pays the sum of the lower valuations,
equal in expectation to
Pn−1
k=1 k. Given this, we denote aggregate expected surplus,
proﬁts and wages in the Vickrey auction by S,V and W.
Now consider what happens if the ﬁrms set salaries simultaneously, with the best
worker going to the top oﬀer and so on. In the ﬁrst case, ﬁrms have symmetric
beliefs about the values of their competitors. There is a symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium, in which each ﬁrm makes an oﬀer that depends monotonically on its
value for quality. Expected salaries are compressed relative to the Vickrey auction:
23worker N expects a lower salary in equilibrium than in a Vickrey auction,23 while
worker 1 expects a positive salary under the match and a zero salary under the
Vickrey auction. Nevertheless, because ﬁrms with higher values make higher oﬀers,
equilibrium is eﬃcient. The expected surplus is again S. Moreover, the Revenue
Equivalence Theorem implies that a ﬁrm with value ∆ expects precisely the same
proﬁt in equilibrium as it does in a Vickrey auction. So aggregate ﬁrm proﬁts and
worker salaries are given by V and W in expectation.
In contrast, with asymmetric ﬁrms, the match leads to worker salaries that are
signiﬁcantly lower in aggregate and substantially compressed relative to the Vickrey
allocation. Also, market surplus is lower. Thus, the combination of nondiscriminatory
pricing and asymmetry are what generate a departure from competitive outcomes.
This situation is summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Asymmetry and Nondiscrimination
Symmetric Firms Asymmetric Firms
Vickrey Match Vickrey Match
Market Surplus SSS < S
Firm Proﬁts VVV À V
Worker Salaries WWW ¿ W
Salary Compression No Some No Yes
We can connect this in a slightly more precise way to auction theory in the fol-
lowing way. The Vickrey auction is essentially a “second-price” environment, where
to get a worker ﬁrms have to pay just enough to outbid their next competitor. In
23In the Vickrey auction, conditional on any top signal, the top ﬁrm will pay its expected Vickrey
cost conditional on its being the highest ranked ﬁrm. In the match, conditional on the same signal,
the ﬁrm will pay its unconditional expected payments in a Vickrey auction, averaging in the lower
costs it will have in cases where it is outbid for the top worker(s). This amount will clearly be




N (∆2). If ∆1 and ∆N are the ﬁrst and Nth order statistics, workers 1 and N expect




N+2, which is less than
N(N−1)
2 , the expected Vickrey salary for worker N. For the bottom
worker the Vickrey salary is zero while the expected symmetric all-pay salary would be N−1
N+2.
24contrast, the match has an “all-pay” ﬂavor. Auction theory tells us that the sym-
metric Vickrey and match auctions will both yield the same average proﬁts for each
type of ﬁrm. Therefore, average wages must be unchanged as well and the scope for
compression is limited. In contrast, in an asymmetric match, equilibrium behavior
leads to progressively greater expected proﬁts for the more highly ranked ﬁrms, and
therefore to progressively lower wages for the workers with whom the better ﬁrms
match. What is remarkable is the degree of redistribution in the model relative to
the very small amount of ineﬃciency.24
9. Conclusion and Extensions
This paper has studied matching markets where ﬁrms compete by setting imper-
sonal prices prior to matching. The ﬁrms’ inability to target their oﬀers leads to
greater proﬁts, with the highest quality ﬁrms beneﬁting the most. The implication
is that wages are both reduced and compressed, with compression beyond the mild
amount that occurs in all-pay competition among symmetric ﬁrms with the same
expected distribution of quality.
A natural question concerns the robustness of our conclusions to the simplifying
assumptions of the model. One strong assumption is that the ﬁrms have perfect
information about the values of their competitors. We have also studied a variant of
the model where each ﬁrm n’s marginal value for worker quality is an independent
privately known draw from an atomless distribution on [tn,tn]. In this version of
the model, there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. Assuming the values of
higher-ranked ﬁrms stochastically dominate those of lower-ranked ﬁrms, their oﬀers
will also be stochastically higher, as in the complete information model.
A special case of the private information model is where each ﬁrm n’s value distri-
bution is tightly concentrated around ∆n. In this case, behavior in the pure strategy
equilibrium is observationally equivalent to behavior in the mixed strategy equilib-
rium of our complete information model (so this model puriﬁes our mixed equilibrium
24Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1993) make another interesting observation about asymmetric
all-pay auctions, which is that revenue (here wages) may actually increase if a high value bidder is
excluded. They consider a single-unit auction, but their point would also apply here.
25in the sense of Harsanyi (1974)). The case where there is more uncertainty about com-
petitors’ values is harder to analyze analytically, but numerical computations conﬁrm
that our results remain valid in that setting.
A second extension that we have pursued with less success is to allow for more
general preferences on the part of workers. It would be interesting to know if our
results continue to hold in a setting where workers have idiosyncratic preferences over
ﬁrms, so for instance worker m’s value from matching with ﬁrm n is given by pn+εmn,
where εmn an idiosyncratic component of utility that is privately known to worker m.
Such a model adds an additional layer of realism, but also substantial complication
because once ﬁrms are diﬀerentiated, they have some market power, making it non-
trivial to even deﬁne an appropriate competitive benchmark. Finding richer tractable
models of matching with non-cooperative price setting is an avenue for future work.
Appendix A: Derivation of the Equilibrium
This appendix ﬁlls in the details omitted from Section 3. We derive the equilibrium
and prove uniqueness in a series of steps.
1. (No Atoms) No equilibrium distribution Gn can have an atom at p>0.
Proof. Suppose ﬁrm m oﬀers p>0 with discrete probability. Then no ﬁrm
n 6= m could optimally make an oﬀer in a small interval below p,s a yt h ei n t e r v a l
[p − ε,p)a n dn oﬁrm n<mwill oﬀer p.B u tt h e nﬁrm m could not be optimizing
since it could achieve a strictly higher payoﬀ by oﬀering p − ε rather than p.
2. (No Aggregate Gaps) In equilibrium at least two ﬁrms oﬀer each p between the
minimum oﬀer 0 and maximum p.
Proof. If there was an interval where only one ﬁrm was active, this ﬁrm could not
be optimizing. If there was an interval where no ﬁrms were active, then the lowest
ranked ﬁrm active just above this interval could not be optimizing.
263. (Aggregate Oﬀers) If G1,...,Gn is an equilibrium, then
P
n gn(p) is non-increasing
in p.
Proof. Let J be the set of ﬁrms that make oﬀers just below p.T h e n i n o r d e r
that these ﬁrms be willing to make oﬀers just below p,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tf o r




n6=j gn(p+). Summing over this inequality over all ﬁrms





4. (No Gaps) Each equilibrium distribution Gn has interval support.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that n makes oﬀers just below p0 and just above
p00 but not in the interval (p0,p 00). Because n is optimizing, it must be the case that





0)] ≤ p − p
0.
with equality when p = p00.S i n c en does not make oﬀe r si nt h i si n t e r v a l ,t h ea b o v e
Lemma implies that
P
m6=n gm(p) is non-increasing in this interval. This implies that
for any p in the gap,
P
m6=n gm(p)= 1
∆n.N o w ,s i n c e n does make oﬀers just above
p00,i tm u s ta l s ob et h ec a s et h a t
P
m6=n gm(p)= 1
∆n for all p just above p00.B u tt h e n
gn(p)=0j u s tb e l o wp00 and gn(p) > 0j u s ta b o v ep00 means that
P
m gm(p)i se q u a l
to 1
∆n just below p00 and is strictly greater than 1
∆n just above p00, contradicting the
previous Lemma.
5. (Monotonicity) If G1,...,GN is an equilibrium, and n>m ,t h e nGn(p) ≤ Gm(p)
for all p.
Proof. Established in the text.
6. (Price Distribution) Suppose that in equilibrium, ﬁrms l,...,m oﬀer p.T h e nf o r












27Proof. E s t a b l i s h e di nt h et e x t .
7. (Supports) If pm < p is the highest oﬀer made by some ﬁrm m,i tm u s tb e
lowest oﬀer of some ﬁrm n>m .
Proof. Suppose that ﬁrms m +1 ,...,n are active just above pm and m,...,n are
active just below pm. Then result 6 above implies that the aggregate oﬀer rate just










∆k. The latter is strictly
greater contradicting the fact that the aggregate oﬀer rate be non-increasing.
8. If m is the highest ﬁrm making oﬀers on some interval, l(m)i st h el e a s t .
Proof. By monotonicity, the set of ﬁrms making oﬀers is consecutive. If l<
l(m), then clearly l,...,m cannot be active since then gl(p) < 0o nt h i si n t e r v a l–
a contradiction. If instead l,...,m are active where l>l (m), then for any p in this
interval,
P
n gn(p) > 1
∆l(m). Since the aggregate oﬀer rate does not include l(m)a b o v e
pl(m) and is non-increasing, it follows that l(m) would do strictly better by oﬀering a
price in this interval or at the top of it than by oﬀering pl(m).
Proof of Proposition 1. We show that the conjectured strategies are the unique
equilibrium. Suppose they are used by each ﬁrm m 6= n.T h e no nt h ei n t e r v a lw h e r e
gn(p) > 0, the aggregate density of opponent oﬀe r si s1 /∆n by construction. So n is
indiﬀerent between all oﬀe r si nt h i sr e g i o n ,t h ei n t e r v a l( pn,pn = pl−1(n)]. If p<p n,
the aggregate density of opponent oﬀers is strictly greater than 1/∆n,s oo ﬀering pn
is strictly preferred to a lower oﬀer. And if p>pn the aggregate density of opponent
oﬀers is strictly less than 1/∆n,s oo ﬀering such a high price cannot be optimal. So
it is optimal for n to use the equilibrium strategy. In terms of uniqueness, it is quite
easy to see that the maximum and minimum oﬀers for each ﬁrm are uniquely pinned
down as in the text. Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Omitted Proofs
28P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .Let G1,...,G n be equilibrium strategies. Arguments sim-
ilar to the above establish that these strategies have no atoms or gaps, and that if
n>m ,t h e nGn(p) ≤ Gm(p)f o ra l lp. The proof now follows the earlier argument for
the linear case. By an analogous argument, V1 = Π1 = v(1,0). Now, note that
Vn − Vn−1 = v(n,n) − v(n − 1,n).
The diﬀerence in the Vickrey proﬁts of n and n−1 is the diﬀerence in their value for
worker n.D e ﬁne ˆ pn as the price that solves:
Πn(ˆ pn)=v(n,n) − ˆ pn.
Such a price exists in the support of n’s equilibrium strategy because at the lowest
price n oﬀers, n gets at best worker n (and potentially lower) and at the highest price
n oﬀers, n gets at worst worker n (and potentially higher), and because Πn(·) will be
continuous in p.M o r e o v e r ,n−1m u s ta l s oo ﬀer ˆ pn, and when it does, the distribution
of worker quality it expects is worse than the distribution n expects in the sense of
ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. So,
Πn − Πn−1 >v (n,n) − v(n − 1,n)=Vn − Vn−1,
completing the proof. Q.E.D.
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Combining these inequalities and re-arranging:
ρ(∆n−(ρ−1)/2 − ∆n−ρ) ≥ ∆n−(ρ−1)/2
ρ(∆n − ∆n−ρ+1) ≤ 2∆n
Substituting for ∆n and re-arranging gives
ρ
2 +2 ρ − 1 ≥ 2n ≥ ρ
2 − ρ.




2n − 1. Q.E.D.
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